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SENSITIVITY OF EQUILIBRIUM IN ATOMIC CONGESTION GAMES WITH
PLAYER-SPECIFIC COST FUNCTIONS
FRE´DE´RIC MEUNIER AND THOMAS PRADEAU
Abstract. Consider an atomic splittable congestion game played on a parallel-link graph with
player-specific cost functions. Richman and Shimkin proved in 2007 that the equilibrium is unique
when the cost functions are continuous, increasing, and strictly convex. It allows to define a function
~e(·) mapping any demand vector to the unique corresponding equilibrium. The general question
we address in this paper is about the behavior of ~e(·): how does the equilibrium change when the
demand vector changes?
By standard arguments regarding the solutions of variational inequalities, we prove that ~e(·) is
continuous. Our main results concern the case when there are only two players or only two arcs.
We show that if the cost functions are twice continuously differentiable, ~e(·) is differentiable at
any point on a neighborhood of which the supports of the player strategies remain constant. We
are able to describe precisely what happens to the support of the strategies at equilibrium when
a player transfers a part of his demand to another player with more demand. It allows to recover
previous results for this kind of game regarding the impact of coalitions on the equilibrium and to
discuss the impact of such transfers on the social cost.
We show moreover that most of these results do not hold when there are at least three players
and three arcs.
1. Introduction
In many contexts, users share common resources to realize some tasks while being not coordi-
nated. Examples of such resources are means of transportation, machines in a flexible manufactur-
ing environment, or arcs in a telecommunication network. Congestion may appear on resources,
leading to strategic behaviors. Game theory is a useful approach to understand and predict the
behaviors of the users and the resulting congestion on the resources. The games arising in such a
context, called congestion games, have been studied since the 50’s, addressing many questions, such
as the existence and the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium, the way to compute it and related
complexity questions, or its efficiency with respect to the social optimum (via the so-called “Price
of Anarchy”).
One stream of questions is about the sensitivity analysis, defined as the evaluation of the impact
of the input (graph, cost functions and demands) on the equilibrium. In practice, these analyses
are used for designing networks, estimating origin-destination matrices, or fixing pricing rules.
Such analyses have been mainly applied to nonatomic congestion games and formulas have been
designed in order to perform the sensitivity analysis, see Tobin and Friesz [1988], Qiu and Magnanti
[1989], Bell and Iida [1997]. Nonatomic means that there is a continuous set of users, each with a
negligible impact on the congestion. Taking a more theoretical point of view, Hall [1978] proved
that the equilibrium flows of nonatomic games played on a network is continuous with respect to
the demand when all users have the same cost functions. This result have been extended for cost
functions depending on the flows on all arcs of the network by Dafermos and Nagurney [1984]. A
more general study, concerning in particular the differentiability, has been made by Patriksson and
Rockafellar [2003] and Patriksson [2004]. The latter gave a characterization for the existence of a
directional derivative of the equilibrium flow with respect to the demand. Josefsson and Patriksson
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[2007] showed that while equilibrium costs are directionally differentiable, this does not hold for
the flows.
A natural intuition would be that an increase of the demand gives an increase of the equilibrium
cost. Hall [1978] proved that this result is true for two-terminal graphs when players have the same
cost functions, and Lin et al. [2011] gave an alternate combinatorial proof of this result. However
this intuition is false in general, as noted for example by Fisk [1979]. Dafermos and Nagurney [1984]
proved that an “average” total cost will necessarily increase. More recently, Englert et al. [2008]
proved that there are networks for which a slight increase of the total demand changes the strategies
of all users. This “microscopic” instability, in the sense that the total flow on each arc does not
change too much, happens in particular for the class of generalized Braess graphs introduced by
Roughgarden [2006].
Our purpose is to make a sensitivity analysis for atomic splittable games. We consider a finite
set of non-negligible players having a stock, the demand, to divide among different resources. For
example, a freight company may have to choose between several means of transportation. This
situation can be modeled by an atomic game on a network with parallel arcs, each arc representing
a resource. This kind of games have been extensively studied, see for example Orda et al. [1993],
Altman et al. [2002], Richman and Shimkin [2007], Bhaskar et al. [2009, 2010]. Further results and
extensions on Nash equilibria in this context can be found in Gairing et al. [2006], Harks [2008],
Cominetti et al. [2009]. These works consider mostly the case when every player is impacted in the
same way by the congestion.
In this paper, we study the sensitivity of the equilibrium in atomic splittable games on parallel-
arcs graphs with player-specific cost functions. Questions like the continuity of the equilibrium and
its differentiability are addressed, as well as questions about the consequence of a partial transfer
of demand from a player to another one with a higher demand. The impact of making coalitions is
a special case of this latter question.
2. Model and main results
2.1. Model. We are given a two-terminal graph with a set A of parallel arcs and K ≥ 2 players
identified with the integers 1, . . . ,K. Throughout the paper, the set {1, . . . ,K} is denoted [K].
We consider the model of atomic splittable games: each player k has a demand dk ∈ R+ and cost
functions cka : R+ → R+, assumed to be increasing, differentiable, and strictly convex. A feasible
strategy for the player k is an element xk = (xka)a∈A of RA+ such that
∑
a∈A x
k
a = d
k. The quantity
xka is then the flow of player k on the arc a. When each player has chosen a strategy, the total flow
on arc a is the quantity xa =
∑K
k=1 x
k
a and the support of the strategy is the set of arcs “used” by
this player
supp(xk) = {a ∈ A : xka > 0}.
The cost supported by player k is
∑
a∈A c
k
a(xa). A vector ~x = (x
1, . . . ,xK)a∈A of feasible
strategies is an equilibrium if for every player k∑
a∈A
xkac
k
a(xa) = min
(yka)∈RA+:
∑
a y
k
a=d
k
∑
a∈A
ykac
k
a(ya).
2.2. Properties. The following characterization of the equilibrium is standard and has been used
for instance in Haurie and Marcotte [1985].
Proposition 1. The vector ~x is an equilibrium if and only if, for all k, the vector xk is a feasible
strategy for player k and∑
a∈A
(cka(xa) + x
k
ac
k
a
′
(xa))(y
k
a − xka) ≥ 0, for any other feasible strategy yk.
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The following proposition is an alternate and again standard characterization of the equilibrium.
Proposition 2. The vector ~x is an equilibrium if and only if, for all k, the vector xk is a feasible
strategy for player k and cka(xa) + x
k
ac
k
a
′
(xa) = pi
k for all a ∈ supp(xk), where
pik = min
a∈A
(
cka(xa) + x
k
ac
k
a
′
(xa)
)
.
cka(xa) + x
k
ac
k
a
′
(xa) is the marginal cost of arc a for player k. Proposition 2 states thus that at
equilibrium, the marginal costs of the arcs in the support of every player are all equal.
For the games considered in this paper, an equilibrium always exists, see Rosen [1965], Orda
et al. [1993]. Furthermore, the graph belongs to the class of nearly-parallel graphs and thus the
equilibrium is unique [Richman and Shimkin, 2007].
2.3. Results. The uniqueness of equilibrium allows to define for each player k the map
ek : RK+ −→ RA+
by defining ek(d) to be the strategy of player k at equilibrium when the demands are given by the
components of d = (d1, . . . , dK). Define
~e : d ∈ RK+ 7−→ (e1(d), . . . , eK(d)) ∈ (RA+)K .
It is a continuous map, see Proposition 3 of Section 3.
A demand transfer is a part δ ∈ [0, di] removed of the demand of a player i and added to the
demand of a player j, the demand of the other players remaining the same. The new demand of
player i is then di − δ and the new demand of player j is then dj + δ.
Theorem 1. Suppose that |A| = 2 or K = 2, and that the cost functions are twice continuously
differentiable. Let d0 ∈ RK+ be a demand vector such that for any pair of players, a sufficiently small
nonzero demand transfer does not modify the supports of the players. Then ~e(·) is differentiable at
d0.
Generically, all d0 ∈ RK+ satisfy this condition (it is for instance a consequence of Corollary 1 of
Section 4.1). We do not know whether this theorem still holds when |A| ≥ 3 and K ≥ 3. However,
we cannot expect ~e(·) to be differentiable everywhere, even if there is only one player, see Section 6.
Our two other main results are about the case when the players i and j involved in the transfer
described above are such that di ≤ dj .
Theorem 2. Suppose that |A| = 2 or K = 2. If a player i transfers a part of his demand to
a player j with di ≤ dj, then, on each arc, the flow of player i (resp. player j) decreases (resp.
increases) or remains constant equal to zero.
The social cost is defined by
Q(~x) =
K∑
k=1
∑
a∈A
xkac
k
a(xa).
It is the cost experienced by all players together.
Theorem 3. Suppose that c1a = · · · = cKa for all a ∈ A (we are no longer in the player-specific cost
setting). Suppose moreover that at least one of the following conditions is satisfied.
• |A| = 2
• K = 2 and the cost functions are twice continuously differentiable .
Then if a player i transfers a part of his demand to a player j with di ≤ dj, the social cost at
equilibrium decreases or remains constant.
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A consequence of this theorem is that if the total demand
∑
k d
k = d is fixed, the equilibrium
with highest social cost is obtained when all players have the same demand equal to d/k. In the
contrary, social cost is reduced when a monopole takes in charge the whole demand. Nevertheless,
this is true under the conditions of the theorem. If these conditions are relaxed, there are situations
where the conclusion of Theorem 3 does not hold, see Section 6.
Theorem 3 is a generalization of Theorem 3.23 of Wan [2012] when there are no nonatomic
players. Wan [2012] proved that when there are two arcs the social cost at equilibrium cannot
increase when two players merge, i.e. in our context when player i transfers all his demand to
player j. The question whether our result remains valid with nonatomic players deserves future
work.
Theorems 1, 2, and 3 are respectively proved in Sections 3, 4, and 5. We emphasize that the
proof of Theorem 3 uses Theorems 1 and 2.
3. Regularity of equilibrium
3.1. Continuity. The following proposition holds for the model described in Section 2.1 in its full
generality. It contrasts with Theorem 1, which requires the cost function to be twice continuously
diffrrentiable.
Proposition 3. The map ~e(·) is continuous.
Proof. Let 4 = {p ∈ RA+ :
∑
a∈A pa = 1} be the (|A|−1)-dimensional simplex and F : 4K×RK+ →
(RA+)K be defined by
F ka (~p,d) =
[
cka
(
K∑
`=1
p`ad
`
)
+ pkad
kcka
′
(
K∑
`=1
p`ad
`
)]
dk,
for every a and k. The application F is continuous in both variables.
According to Proposition 1, ~e(d) is the equilibrium if and only if eka(d) = p
k
ad
k for all a and k,
where ~p satisfies the variational inequality
(V I(d)) F (~p,d) · (~q − ~p) ≥ 0 for any ~q ∈ 4K .
By a sequential argument, using the continuity of F and the compactness of 4K , elementary
calculations give that the solution of (V I(d)) is continuous with respect to d. 
3.2. Proof of Theorem 1. The strategies at equilibrium are completely determined by the sup-
ports of the players. This is due to the increasing assumption of the costs. When the supports are
given, the equilibrium is characterized by equalities and then the inverse function theorem makes
the job. This is the core idea of the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 1. Suppose that the cost functions are twice continuously differentiable. Choose an Sk ⊆ A
for each player k. Define the application H :
∏K
k=1RS
k
+ × RK+ →
∏K
k=1RS
k × RK by H(~y,pi) =
(G(~y,pi), D(~y)), where for a ∈ Sk, yk ∈ Sk, and pi ∈ RK , we have
Gka(~y,pi) = c
k
a(ya) + y
k
ac
k
a
′
(ya)− pik and Dk(~y) =
∑
a∈Sk
yka .
Let ~z be such that za > 0 for every a ∈ Sk and every player k, and let pi ∈ RK . Then H is contin-
uously differentiable and invertible in a neighborhood of (~z,pi), with a continuously differentiable
inverse.
Proof. Since ca is twice continuously differentiable for every a, the map H is continuously differen-
tiable. We will show that the Jacobian matrix J of H at (~z,pi) is nonsingular. The conclusion will
then follow from the inverse function theorem.
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We define gka = c
k
a
′
(za) + z
k
ac
k
a
′′
(za) for every a ∈ Sk and hka = cka′(za) for every a ∈ A. Note that
because of the assumptions, they are positive when a ∈ Sk. A direct calculation gives the entries
of J . For k ∈ [K] and a ∈ Sk, we have
∂Gka
∂y`b
(~z,pi) =
 g
k
a for a = b, k 6= `
gka + h
k
a for a = b, k = `
0 for a 6= b.
∂Gka
∂pi`
(~z,pi) =
{
0 for k 6= `
−1 for k = `
∂Dk
∂y`b
(~z,pi) =
{
0 for k 6= `
1 for k = `.
∂Dk
∂pi`
(~z,pi) = 0.
We prove now that J is nonsingular by showing that its kernel contains only the zero vector. We
denote by Ka the set of players effectively using arc a:
Ka = {k ∈ [K] : a ∈ Sk}.
Let (~λ,µ) ∈∏Kk=1RSk ×RK be in the kernel of J . The equality J(~λ,µ) = 0 can be written under
the form
(1)

Maλa = µa for a ∈ A,∑
a∈Sk
λka = 0 for k ∈ [K].
where λa = (λ
k
a)k∈Ka and µa = (µk)k∈Ka , with Ma = (mk,`) being the |Ka|× |Ka| matrix such that
mk,` =
{
gka for k 6= `
gka + h
k
a for k = `.
It can be readily checked that Ma is a nonsingular matrix because the g
k
a and the h
k
a are positive.
In order to consider matrices with same dimension, we define ~Λ ∈ ∏Kk=1RA by Λka = λka for
a ∈ Ka and 0 elsewhere. The system (1) is then equivalent to the following system:
Λa = M
′
aµ for a ∈ A,∑
a∈A
Λa = 0,
where M ′a is a K ×K matrix obtained from M−1a by setting the missing coefficients to zero. These
conditions imply that ∑
a∈A
Λa =
(∑
a∈A
M ′a
)
µ = 0.
A Z-matrix is a square matrix whose nondiagonal coefficients are nonpositive. According to a theo-
rem by Minkowski [1900], if each column of a Z-matrix has a positive sum, then it is a nonsingular
matrix. For more details, see [Berman and Plemmons, 1979, Chapter 6]. It can be checked that
each M ′a is such a Z-matrix. Their sum is thus also such a Z-matrix, and is thus nonsingular. It
gives µ = 0 and then Λa = 0 for all a ∈ A. In particular, ~λ = 0. Therefore, J is nonsingular. 
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Proof of Theorem 1. Let d0 be as in the statement. Define S
k to be supp(ek(d0)). Let ~x = ~e(d0).
There exists pi ∈ RK+ such that
cka(xa) + x
k
ac
k
a
′
(xa)− pik = 0 for k ∈ [K], a ∈ Sk∑
a∈A x
k
a = d
k
0 for k ∈ [K]
xka = 0 for k ∈ [K], a /∈ Sk
cka(xa) + x
k
ac
k
a
′
(xa)− pik > 0 for k ∈ [K], a /∈ Sk.
Indeed, it is a consequence of Proposition 2, except the fact that the last inequality is strict. We
prove now this latter fact.
Assume for a contradiction that there is a player k such that cka(xa) + x
k
ac
k
a
′
(xa)− pik = 0, while
a /∈ Sk. The continuity of ~e and Corollary 2 (see Section 4) would then imply that a slight transfer
of demand to player k would change the support of his strategy, which is in contradiction with the
assumption regarding the non-modification of the support. Corollary 2 can be used since we have
assumed that |A| = 2 or K = 2.
We can apply Lemma 1: there is a neighborhood V of (0,d0) in
∏
k∈[K]RS
k×RK such that H−1
exists on V and is differentiable.
Define
P : (z,pi) ∈
∏
k∈[K]
RS
k
+ × RK+ 7−→ y ∈
∏
k∈[K]
RA+
with
yka =
{
zka if a ∈ Sk
0 otherwise.
Let (~z,pi) = H−1(0,d)) for some (0,d) ∈ V . It is straightforward to check that (P (~z,pi),pi) is a
solution of the system above with dk0 replaced by d
k, and thus that P (~z,pi) satisfies the condition
of Proposition 2. In other word, ~e(d) = P (H−1(0,d)) for (0,d) ∈ V . The map P is differentiable
everywhere and H−1 is differentiable on V . It leads to the desired conclusion. 
4. Equilibrium and demand transfers: proof of Theorem 2
4.1. A more general result. Theorem 2 is a direct consequence of the following proposition. We
define dδ the vector of demands after player i has transferred a part δ > 0 of his demand to player
j:
diδ = d
i − δ, djδ = dj + δ, and dkδ = dk for k 6= i, j.
Proposition 4. Suppose that |A| = 2 or K = 2, and let ~x = ~e(d) and ~y = ~e(dδ). Let a ∈ A.
If xia ≤ yia, then xia = yia = 0 and xa ≤ ya.
If xja ≥ yja, then xja = yja = 0 and xa ≥ ya.
In case |A| = 2, we have moreover (xka − yka)(xa − ya) ≤ 0 for k 6= i, j.
This proposition is proved in the next subsection. We first show two corollaries. They will be
useful in the proof of Theorem 3. The second one is also used in the proof of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. Suppose that |A| = 2 or K = 2, and let ~x = ~e(d) and ~y = ~e(dδ). Then,
• supp(yi) ⊆ supp(xi) and supp(xj) ⊆ supp(yj).
• {a ∈ A : ya < xa} ⊆ supp(xi) and {a ∈ A : ya > xa} ⊆ supp(yj).
Proof. Let a be an arc in supp(yi). We have yia 6= 0. Proposition 4 implies then that xia > yia,
which shows that supp(yi) ⊆ supp(xi). The inclusion supp(xj) ⊆ supp(yj) is proved similarly.
This shows the first point.
Let a be such that ya < xa. Proposition 4 implies then that x
i
a > y
i
a, which shows that
a ∈ supp(xi). The other inclusion is proved similarly. This shows the second point. 
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We consider now the “limit” case when the cost of an arc with no flow is equal to the marginal
cost.
Corollary 2. Suppose that |A| = 2 or K = 2, and let ~x = ~e(d) and ~y = ~e(dδ).
If b /∈ supp(xj) is such that cjb(xb) = mina∈A(cja(xa) + xjacj
′
a (xa)), then b ∈ supp(yj).
If b /∈ supp(yi) is such that cib(yb) = mina∈A(cia(ya) + yjaci
′
a (ya)), then b ∈ supp(xi).
Proof. We only prove the first point, the proof of the second one being similar. If xb < yb, we
have b ∈ supp(yj) because of Corollary 1. We can thus assume for the remaining of the proof
that xb ≥ yb. Suppose for a contradiction that b /∈ supp(yj). Consider an arc a ∈ supp(yj).
Proposition 4 gives that xja < y
j
a. We have moreover
cja(xa) + x
j
ac
j
a
′
(xa) ≥ cjb(xb) ≥ cjb(yb) ≥ cja(ya) + yjacja
′
(ya).
The first inequality is a consequence of the assumption on b, the second one is a consequence of the
inequality xb ≥ yb, the third one is a consequence of Proposition 2. Since cja and cja′ are increasing,
we get that xa > ya.
Thus any arc a ∈ supp(yj) is such that xa > ya. Now, take such an arc α, i.e. such that xα > yα.
Since the total demand is the same before and after the transfer, there must be an arc α′ 6= α such
that xα′ < yα′ . According to Corollary 1, we have α
′ ∈ supp(yj). This is in contradiction with the
fact that such an arc must satisfy xα′ > yα′ . 
4.2. Proof of Proposition 4. We start with a technical lemma.
Lemma 2. Let du,dv ∈ RK+ and let ~u = ~e(du) and ~v = ~e(dv) for k ∈ [K]. Let a and b be two arcs
such that ua ≤ va and ub ≥ vb. If k is a player such that uka < vka , then ukb = vkb = 0 or ukb < vkb .
Proof. If ukb = 0, then u
k
b ≤ vkb , with equality if and only if ukb = vkb = 0. We can thus suppose that
ukb > 0. Proposition 2 gives c
k
b (ub)+u
k
b c
k
b
′
(ub) ≤ cka(ua)+ukacka′(ua). Since 0 ≤ uka < vka , Proposition 2
gives cka(va) + v
k
ac
k
a
′
(va) ≤ ckb (vb) + vkb ckb
′
(vb). These two equations together with the facts that c
k
a
and cka
′
are increasing, ua ≤ va, and uka < vka give that ckb (ub) + ukb ckb
′
(ub) < c
k
b (vb) + v
k
b c
k
b
′
(vb).
Finally, since ub ≥ vb and since ckb and ckb
′
are increasing, we have ukb < v
k
b . 
Proof of Proposition 4. Let us first suppose that x = y. Since di > diδ, there is at least one arc a
such that xia > y
i
a. Lemma 2 with ~u = ~y and ~v = ~x implies that y
i
b = x
i
b = 0 or y
i
b < x
i
b for all arcs
b ∈ A. We get the desired conclusion for i. The proof of the conclusion for j is similar and omitted.
Finally, in case |A| = 2, Lemma 2 with ~u = ~x and ~v = ~y together with the fact that dk = dkδ for
k 6= i, j shows that xka = yka for both arcs a in A, leading to the desired inequality. We can thus
assume for the remaining of the proof that x 6= y.
We first deal with the case K = 2. Since x 6= y, there is an arc α ∈ A such that xα 6= yα.
Without loss of generality xα < yα, and there is an arc β ∈ A such that xβ > yβ. We have x`α < y`α
for a player ` ∈ {i, j} and x`′β > y`
′
β for a player `
′ ∈ {i, j} (there are only two players).
For every arc b such that xb ≥ yb, apply Lemma 2 with a = α, ~u = ~x, ~v = ~y, and k = `. It gives
that x`b = y
`
b = 0 or x
`
b < y
`
b. In particular when applied with b = β, we get ` 6= `′. Since xb ≥ yb,
we have x`
′
b ≥ y`
′
b .
For every arc b such that xb ≤ yb, apply Lemma 2 with a = β, ~u = ~y, ~v = ~x, and k = `′. It
gives that x`
′
b = y
`′
b = 0 and y
`′
b < x
`′
b . Since xb ≤ yb, we have x`b ≤ y`b.
Summing these inequalities over all arcs b, we get that d` ≤ d`δ and d`
′ ≥ d`′δ , and we conclude
that ` = j and `′ = i.
We have proved that xia = y
i
a = 0 or x
i
a > y
i
a for every arc a such that xa ≤ ya, and xia ≥ yia
for every arc a such that xa ≥ ya. It remains to prove that xia > yia is strict for arcs a such that
7
xa > ya. Consider then such an arc a. Since x
j
a ≤ yja and there are only two players, we have a strict
inequality for player i too: xia > y
i
a. A similar argument for player j leads to the desired conclusion.
Suppose that |A| = 2. Let α and β be the two arcs and suppose without loss of generality that
xα < yα and xβ > yβ. Applying Lemma 2 with a = α, b = β, ~u = ~x, and ~v = ~y, we get that
xkα ≥ ykα for all k 6= j (using the fact the dk ≥ dkδ for such a player k). Since xα < yα, we get that
xjα < y
j
α. For a player k 6= i, j, we have dk = dkδ . Thus xkβ ≤ ykβ for such a player. Note that we
already get the last statement of the proposition.
Applying again Lemma 2 with a = α, b = β, ~u = ~x, ~v = ~y, but this time for k = j, we get that
xjβ = y
j
β = 0 or x
j
β < y
j
β. This already gives the conclusion for player j. Since xβ > yβ, it implies
that xiβ > y
i
β. It remains to prove that the conclusion holds for player i. Let a be an arc such that
xia ≤ yia. We necessarily have a = α. Applying Lemma 2, this times with a = β, b = α, ~u = ~y, and
~v = ~x allows then to conclude. 
5. Social cost at equilibrium when players have same cost functions: proof of
Theorem 3
5.1. Main steps of the proof. The proof of Theorem 3 relies on two results: Corollary 1 and
the following proposition, proved in the remaining of the section. We define dδ as in Section 4
diδ = d
i − δ, djδ = dj + δ, and dkδ = dk for k 6= i, j.
Throughout the section, the inequality di ≤ dj is assumed.
Proposition 5. Suppose that we are under the condition of Theorem 3 and that there exists δ > 0
such that supp(ek(d)) = supp(ek(dδ)) for both players k = i and k = j. Then there exists η > 0
such that h 7→ Q(~e(dh)) is nonincreasing on [0, η].
If ~e(·) is differentiable, e.g. the cost functions are twice continuously differentiable (Theorem 1),
then we can actually show that h 7→ Q(~e(dh)) is differentiable with a nonpositive derivative at 0.
The remaining of the section is devoted to the proof of this proposition. We finish this subsection
by explaining how this proposition can be used to prove Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3. Corollary 1 implies that when player i transfers a part of his demand to
player j, the support of player i does not increase and the support of player j does not decrease.
It implies that for k = i and k = j, the set supp(ek(dh)) changes a finite number of times when
h goes from 0 to di. Hence, for almost all h′ ∈ [0, di], there exists some δ > 0 (depending on
h′) such that supp(ek(dh′)) = supp(ek(dh′+δ)) for both k = i and k = j. Thus, Proposition 5
implies that h′ 7→ Q(~e(dh′)) is nonincreasing almost everywhere on [0, di]. Since h′ 7→ Q(~e(dh′))
is continuous according to Proposition 3, the map h′ 7→ Q(~e(dh′)) is nonincreasing on the whole
interval [0, di]. 
5.2. Technical lemmas. Throughout this subsection, we assume that we are no longer in the
player-specific cost function setting, i.e. we suppose that c1a = · · · = cKa for all a ∈ A. The cost
function attached to arc a is denoted ca without superscript. We emphasize that the result of this
subsection do not necessarily hold when we assume the costs to be player-specific.
We have divided this subsection into two parts. The first one deals with results regarding the
supports of the strategies. The second one deals with the derivate of the social cost at equilibrium
seen as a function of the transfer.
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5.2.1. Lemmas about the supports. The following lemma has been proved by Orda et al. [1993]. It
is stated here without proof.
Lemma 3. Let ~x = ~e(d). If dk1 ≤ dk2, then xk1a ≤ xk2a for every arc a.
The next lemma deals with the case when the condition of Proposition 5 is satisfied and when
moreover the supports of player i and j are identical. In this case, the social cost is not only
nonincreasing, it is even constant.
Lemma 4. Suppose that there exists δ ∈ (0, di] such that
supp(ei(d)) = supp(ej(d)) = supp(ei(dδ)) = supp(e
j(dδ)).
Then there exists η > 0 such that h 7→ Q(~e(dh)) is constant on [0, η].
Proof. Let ~x = ~e(d) and denote ~y(h) = ~e(dh). Denote by S0 be the common support: S0 =
supp(xi) = supp(xj). Let
pik = min
a∈A
(
ca(xa) + x
k
aca(xa)
)
.
It is the marginal cost at equilibrium for player k when the demand is d. Let η = min(δ0, δ1),
where
δ0 = min
a∈S0
(
xiac
′
a(xa)
) ∑
a∈S0
1
c′a(xa)
and δ1 =
(
min
b/∈S0
cb(xb)− pij
) ∑
a∈S0
1
c′a(xa)
.
η is well defined since c′a(x) > 0 for every x > 0, and is nonnegative, according to Proposition 2.
Moreover, Corollary 2 shows that η > 0.
Let h ≤ η. We consider the strategy vector ~z defined by
zka = x
k
a +
dkh − dk
βc′a(xa)
1{a∈S0} for every player k
where β =
∑
a∈S0
1
c′a(xa)
. The remaining of the proof consists in showing that ~z = ~y(h). Since such
a ~z satisfies za = xa for all a (checking straightforward), it will show that xa = ya(h) for all a, and
in particular that Q(x) = Q(y(h)).
We first check that ~z leads to feasible strategies. For each player k and arc a, we have zka ≥ 0
since h ≤ δ0. We have moreover
∑
a∈A z
k
a = d
k
h for each player k. Hence, we have feasible strategies.
We check now that ~z is an equilibrium for dh, by checking that it satisfies the condition of
Proposition 2. Consider first a player k ∈ {i, j}. For every arc a ∈ S0, we have
ca(za) + z
k
ac
′
a(za) = ca(xa) + x
k
ac
′
a(xa) +
dkh − dk
β
= pik +
dkh − dk
β
Consider now an arc a /∈ S0. By definition of zka , we have zka = xka = 0 (we still work with k ∈ {i, j})
and thus
ca(za) = ca(xa) ≥ pij + h
β
≥ pik + d
k
h − dk
β
,
where the first equality holds since za = xa, the first inequality since h ≤ δ1, and the last inequality
for player i since pij ≥ pii, according to Lemma 3. The condition of Proposition 2 is satisfied for
every player k ∈ {i, j}. Consider now a player k 6= {i, j}. We have dkh = dk and thus zka = xka
for all a ∈ A. Hence, we have ca(za) + zkac′a(za) = pik for a ∈ supp(zk) and ca(za) ≥ pik for
a /∈ supp(zk). Again, the Proposition 2 is satisfied, this time for the players k /∈ {i, j}. Therefore,
~z is an equilibrium for the demand dh.
By uniqueness of the equilibrium, ~z = ~y(h). 
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The following lemma can be seen as a complement of Corollary 1.
Lemma 5. Suppose that |A| = 2 or K = 2. Let δ ∈ (0, di) and denote ~x = ~e(d), ~y = ~e(dδ).
Suppose that supp(xi) = supp(yi) 6= supp(xj) = supp(yj). If x 6= y, then
{a ∈ A, ya < xa} = supp(xi) and {a ∈ A, ya > xa} = supp(xj) \ supp(xi).
Proof. Assume that x 6= y, i.e. that there exists an arc a on which xa 6= ya (and thus there are at
least two such arcs, since the total demand remains constant).
Suppose first that |A| = 2. Corollary 1 gives that {a ∈ A : ya < xa} ⊆ supp(xi) and
{a ∈ A : ya > xa} ⊆ supp(xj). Since x 6= y, then there exists an arc α with yα < xα and
an arc α′ such that yα′ > xα′ . Since supp(xi) ⊆ supp(xj) (Lemma 3), | supp(xj)| ≤ 2, and
supp(xi) 6= supp(xj), we get the conclusion.
Suppose now that K = 2. Again, there exists an arc α with yα < xα. Corollary 1 implies that
α ∈ supp(xi), and thus according to the assumption, we also have α ∈ supp(yi). Lemma 3 implies
that supp(xi) ⊆ supp(xj) and supp(yi) ⊆ supp(yj). Proposition 2 implies thus that
2ca(xa) + xac
′
a(xa) = 2cα(xα) + xαc
′
α(xα) for all a ∈ supp(xi),
by summing the two marginal costs for the two players i and j, and similarly that
2ca(ya) + yac
′
a(ya) = 2cα(yα) + yαc
′
α(yα) for all a ∈ supp(yi).
Since yα < xα and since u 7→ 2ca(u) + uc′a(u) is increasing, we get ya < xa for all a ∈ supp(xi).
Combining this with the inclusion {a ∈ A : ya < xa} ⊆ supp(xi) given by Corollary 1, we get that
{a ∈ A : ya < xa} = supp(xi).
Take now an arc a in supp(xj) \ supp(xi) = supp(yj) \ supp(yi). It is necessarily such that
yja = ya ≥ xa = xja. Suppose for a contradiction that ya = xa, then Proposition 4 gives xja = yja = 0,
which contradicts the way a has been taken. Thus ya > xa. Conversely, take an arc a such that
ya > xa. It is not in supp(y
i). Thus yja = ya > 0, which implies that a ∈ supp(yj). Since
supp(yj) = supp(xj), we get the conclusion. 
5.2.2. Lemmas about the derivate of the social cost. Given z = RA+ and an arc a ∈ A, we define
the vector z−a ∈ RA\{a}+ by z−a = (zb)b 6=a. Then for every arc a ∈ A, we consider the function
Qa : R
A\{a}
+ → R+ defined by
Qa(z
−a) =
∑
a′ 6=a
zbcb(zb) +
d−∑
b6=a
zb
 ca
d−∑
b 6=a
zb
 ,
where d =
∑
k∈[K] d
k is the total demand.
Let x ∈ RA+ be such that
∑
a∈A xa = d. We have then Qa(x
−a) = Q(~x) and for any b 6= a
(2)
∂Qa
∂zb
(x−a) = cb(xb) + xbc′b(xb)−
(
ca(xa) + xac
′
a(xa)
)
.
Denote ~y(h) = ~e(dh).
Lemma 6. Let h ∈ (0, di]. Suppose that supp(yi(h)) 6= supp(yj(h)). Let a ∈ supp(yi(h)) and
b ∈ supp(yj(h)) \ supp(yi(h)). We have then
∂Qa
∂zb
(y−a(h)) < 0.
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Proof. Let ~x = ~y(h). Since a ∈ supp(xi), we have cb(xb) ≥ ca(xa) + xiac′a(xa) > ca(xa). Consider
the set Ib of players k such that b ∈ supp(xk). The set Ib is nonempty and for every player k ∈ Ib
we have, according to Proposition 2, cb(xb) +x
k
b c
′
b(xb) ≤ ca(xa) +xkac′a(xa). By summing over these
players, we get
|Ib|cb(xb) + xbc′b(xb) ≤ |Ib|ca(xa) +
xa −∑
k/∈Ib
xka
 c′a(xa) < |Ib|ca(xa) + xac′a(xa).
Since |Ib| ≥ 1 and cb(xb) > ca(xa), we have cb(xb) + xbc′b(xb) < ca(xa) + xac′a(xa), and thus, using
Equation (2), we have
∂Qa
∂zb
(x−a) < 0. 
Lemma 7. Suppose that K = 2. Let h ∈ (0, di]. There always exists an arc a ∈ supp(yi(h)) such
that
∂Qa
∂zb
(y−a(h)) ≥ 0
for all b ∈ supp(yi(h)) \ {a}.
Proof. Let ~x = ~y(h). Pick an arc a ∈ arg max{cα(xα) : α ∈ supp(xi)}.
Let then b ∈ supp(xi) \ {a}. Lemma 3 implies that supp(xi) ⊆ supp(xj). Thus a and b are in
supp(xj). Summing the marginal costs for players i and j, we get
2ca(xa) + xac
′
a(xa) = 2cb(xb) + xbc
′
b(xb).
According to the definition of a, we have ca(xa) ≥ cb(xb) and then
ca(xa) + xac
′
a(xa) ≤ cb(xb) + xbc′b(xb).
Thus, using Equation (2), we have
∂Qa
∂zb
(x−a) ≥ 0. 
5.3. Proof of Proposition 5.
Proof of Proposition 5. Let ~x = ~e(d) and denote ~y(h) = ~e(dh).
Suppose first that |A| = 2. If we are under the condition of Lemma 4, the conclusion is immediate.
We can thus assume that supp(xi) = supp(yi(δ)) 6= supp(xj) = supp(yj(δ)). Since there are only
two arcs, there is an arc a ∈ supp(xi) and an arc b ∈ supp(xj) \ supp(xi). We have Q(~y(h)) =
Qa(yb(h)) (there are only two arcs in A). A first application of Corollary 1 shows that supp(y
i(h)) ⊆
supp(xi). A second application shows that supp(yi(δ)) ⊆ supp(yi(h)). Since it is assumed that
supp(xi) = supp(yi(δ)) for all h ∈ [0, δ], we get that supp(yi(h) = supp(xi) for all h ∈ [0, δ].
Similarly, supp(yj(h) = supp(xj) for all h ∈ [0, δ]
Lemma 5 shows that the total flow on b increases when h increases (b is in supp(yj(h)) \
supp(yi(h))). The map h 7→ yb(h) is thus an increasing map on [0, δ]. According to Lemma 6,
we have
∂Qa
∂zb
(yb(h)) < 0.
Thus Qa is decreasing on [yb(0), yb(δ)]. Therefore the map h 7→ Q(~y(h)) is decreasing on [0, δ].
Suppose now that K = 2 and that the cost functions are twice continuously differentiable.
If we are under the condition of Lemma 4, the conclusion is immediate. We can thus assume
that supp(xi) = supp(yi(δ)) 6= supp(xj) = supp(yj(δ)). Again, supp(yi(h)) and supp(yj(h)) are
constant for all h ∈ [0, δ].
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Choose h0, h ∈ (0, δ), with h 6= h0. Let a ∈ supp(yi(h0)) as in Lemma 7. Lemma 5 shows that
yb(h) − yb(h0) and h − h0 have opposite signs when b ∈ supp(yi(h0)) \ {a} and same sign when
b ∈ supp(yj(h0)) \ supp(yi(h0)). Thus,∑
b∈supp(yi(h0))\{a}
∂Qa
∂zb
(
y−a(h0)
) yb(h)− yb(h0)
h− h0 ≤ 0
for all h ∈ (0, δ), and ∑
b∈supp(yj(h0))\supp(yi(h0))
∂Qa
∂zb
(
y−a(h0)
) yb(h)− yb(h0)
h− h0 ≤ 0
for all h ∈ (0, δ) (with the help of Lemma 6). This sum over arcs b not in supp(yj(h0)) is zero since
yb(h) = yb(h0) = 0. Besides, the cost functions being differentiable and since there are only two
players, we can apply Theorem 1: h 7→ ~y(h) is differentiable in a neighborhood of h0. Using the
above inequalities, we get that the derivative of h 7→ Q(~y(h)) is nonpositive at h0:∑
b6=a
∂Qa
∂zb
(y−a(h0))y′b(h0) = lim
h→h0
∑
b6=a
∂Qa
∂zb
(y−a(h0))
yb(h)− yb(h0)
h− h0 ≤ 0.
Since this is true for any h0 ∈ (0, δ), we get the conclusion: h 7→ Q(~y(h)) is nonincreasing on [0, δ]
(using the continuity of h 7→ ~y(h) ensured by Proposition 3 to get the conclusion for the boundary
of [0, δ]). 
6. Discussion
6.1. ~e(·) is not differentiable everywhere. The application ~e(·) is not differentiable everywhere
as shown by the following example, inspired from Hall [1978]. Consider a parallel-link graph with
two arcs a and b and only one player with demand d. Suppose that the cost functions are
ca(x) = x+ 1 and cb(x) = x.
A direct calculation gives that at equilibrium xa = 0 and xb = d when 0 ≤ d ≤ 12 , and xa = 2d−14 ,
xb =
2d+1
4 when d ≥ 12 . Hence ~e is not differentiable at the point d = 12 .
6.2. When there are three arcs and three players. Theorems 3 is not valid when there are
three arcs and three players. We introduce the example of Huang [2011], for which the social cost
at equilibrium increases after a transfer.
Consider a parallel-link graph with three arcs a, b, and c, and three players 1, 2, and 3. Suppose
that the players have the same cost functions
ca(x) = 20x+ 5000, cb(x) = x
2 + 500, and cc(x) = x
11.
When the vector of demand is d = (0.1, 20.9, 200), the (rounded) flows at equilibrium are in the
following table and the equilibrium cost is 1 558 627.
Arc a b c
Flow
player 1 0 0 0.1
player 2 0 20.18 0.72
player 3 152.50 46.38 1.12
Total flow 152.50 66.55 1.95
After the transfer of δ = 0.1 from player 1 to player 2, we have demands dδ = (0, 21, 200).
The (rounded) flows at equilibrium are in the following table and the social cost at equilibrium is
1 558 633. In particular, the cost has increased after the transfer.
12
Arc a b c
Flow
player 1 0 0 0
player 2 0 20.24 0.76
player 3 152.49 46.33 1.18
Total flow 152.49 66.57 1.94
Moreover, the part regarding players that keep the same demand in Proposition 4 (more general
result than Theorem 2) does not hold either, since (y3a − x3a)(ya− xa) > 0, where ~x (resp. ~y) is the
equilibrium flow before (resp. after) the transfer. However Theorem 2 still holds: on each arc the
flow of player 1 decreases or remains constant equal to zero, and the flow of player 2 increases or
remains constant equal to zero.
6.3. When we allow player-specific cost functions. Another question is whether Theorem 3
remains valid when we allow player-specific cost functions. The answer is ‘no’, as shown by the
following example.
Consider a parallel-link graph with two arcs a and b, and two players 1 and 2. Let the cost on arc
b for player 1 (resp. on arc a for player 2) be prohibitively high, in such a way that at equilibrium,
for every repartition of the demand, player 1 (resp. 2) puts all his demand on arc a (resp. b). Let
the costs be c1a(x) = 2x, c
2
b(x) = x. If d
1 = 3 and d2 = 2, the social cost at equilibrium is 8, while
after a transfer of 1, i.e. if d1 = 4 and d2 = 1, the social cost at equilibrium is 9. The result of
Theorem 3 does not hold if we allow player-specific costs.
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